Designing Policies for Truth: Combating Misinformation with Transparency and Information Design
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Misinformation has become a growing issue on online social platforms (OSPs), especially during elections or pandemics. To combat this, OSPs have implemented various policies, such as tagging, to notify users about potentially misleading information. However, these policies are often transparent and therefore susceptible to being exploited by content creators, who may not be willing to invest effort into producing authentic content, causing the viral spread of misinformation. Instead of mitigating the reach of existing misinformation, this work focuses on a solution of prevention, aiming to stop the spread of misinformation before it has a chance to gain momentum. We propose a Bayesian persuaded branching process (BP^2) to model the strategic interactions among the OSP, the content creator, and the user. The misinformation spread on OSP is modeled by a multi-type branching process, where users' positive and negative comments influence the misinformation spreading. Using a Lagrangian induced by Bayesian plausibility, we characterize the OSP's optimal policy under the perfect Bayesian equilibrium. The convexity of the Lagrangian implies that the OSP's optimal policy is simply the fully informative tagging policy: revealing the content's accuracy to the user. Such a tagging policy solicits the best effort from the content creator in reducing misinformation, even though the OSP exerts no direct control over the content creator. We corroborate our findings using numerical simulations.
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