Decentralized Attack Search and the Design of Bug Bounty Schemes
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Systems and blockchains often have security vulnerabilities and can be attacked by adversaries, with potentially significant negative consequences. Therefore, organizations and blockchain infrastructure providers increasingly rely on bug bounty programs, where external individuals probe the system and report any vulnerabilities (bugs) in exchange for monetary rewards (bounty). We develop a contest model for bug bounty programs with an arbitrary number of agents who decide whether to undertake a costly search for bugs or not. Search costs are private information. Besides characterizing the ensuing equilibria, we show that even inviting an unlimited crowd does not guarantee that bugs are found. Adding paid agents can increase the efficiency of the bug bounty scheme although the crowd that is attracted becomes smaller. Finally, adding (known) bugs increases the likelihood that unknown bugs are found, but to limit reward payments it may be optimal to add them only with some probability.
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