DCA: Delayed Charging Attack on the Electric Shared Mobility System
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An efficient operation of the electric shared mobility system (ESMS) relies heavily on seamless interconnections between shared electric vehicles (SEV), electric vehicle supply equipment (EVSE), and the grid. Nevertheless, this interconnectivity also makes the ESMS vulnerable to cyberattacks that may cause short-term breakdowns or long-term degradation of the ESMS. This study focuses on one such attack with long-lasting effects, the Delayed Charge Attack (DCA), that stealthily delays the charging service by exploiting the physical and communication vulnerabilities. To begin, we present the ESMS threat model by highlighting the assets, information flow, and access points. We next identify a linked sequence of vulnerabilities as a viable attack vector for launching DCA. Then, we detail the implementation of DCA, which can effectively bypass the detection in the SEV's battery management system and the cross-verification in the cloud environment. We test the DCA model against various Anomaly Detection (AD) algorithms by simulating the DCA dynamics in a Susceptible-Infectious-Removed-Susceptible (SIRS) process, where the EVSE can be compromised by the DCA or detected for repair. Using real-world taxi trip data and EVSE locations in New York City, the DCA model allows us to explore the long-term impacts and validate the system consequences. The results show that a 10-min delay will result in 12-min longer queuing times and 8 unfulfilled requests, leading to a 10.7 driver. With the AD algorithms, the weekly revenue loss remains at 3.8 ($111.8), suggesting the robustness of the DCA.
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