Cryptanalysis of the Privacy-Preserving Ride-Hailing Service TRACE
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In a typical ride-hailing service, the service provider (RS) matches a customer (RC) with the closest vehicle (RV) registered to this service. TRACE is an efficient privacy-preserving ride-hailing service proposed by Wang et al. in 2018. TRACE uses masking along with other cryptographic techniques to ensure efficient and accurate ride-matching. The RS uses masked location information to match RCs and RVs within a quadrant without obtaining their exact locations, thus ensuring privacy. In this work, we disprove the privacy claims in TRACE by showing the following: a) RCs and RVs can identify the secret spatial division maintained by RS (this reveals information about the density of RVs in the region and other potential trade secrets), and b) the RS can identify exact locations of RCs and RVs (this violates location privacy). Prior to exchanging encrypted messages in the TRACE protocol, each entity masks the plaintext message with a secret unknown to others. Our attack allows other entities to recover this plaintext from the masked value by exploiting shared randomness used across different messages, that eventually leads to a system of linear equations in the unknown plaintexts. This holds even when all the participating entities are honest-but-curious. We implement our attack and demonstrate its efficiency and high success rate. For the security parameters recommended for TRACE, an RV can recover the spatial division in less than a minute, and the RS can recover the location of an RV in less than a second on a commodity laptop.
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