
Regular Potential Games
A fundamental problem with the Nash equilibrium concept is the existence...
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Double Oracle Algorithm for Computing Equilibria in Continuous Games
Many efficient algorithms have been designed to recover Nash equilibria ...
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Convergence of Learning Dynamics in Stackelberg Games
This paper investigates the convergence of learning dynamics in Stackelb...
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Finding Equilibrium in MultiAgent Games with Payoff Uncertainty
We study the problem of finding equilibrium strategies in multiagent ga...
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A Unified View of Largescale Zerosum Equilibrium Computation
The task of computing approximate Nash equilibria in large zerosum exte...
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A NonCooperative Game Approach to Autonomous Racing
We consider autonomous racing of two cars and present an approach to for...
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Computing BayesNash Equilibria in Combinatorial Auctions with Verification
Combinatorial auctions (CAs) are mechanisms that are widely used in prac...
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Computing Stackelberg Equilibria of Large GeneralSum Games
We study the computational complexity of finding Stackelberg Equilibria in generalsum games, where the set of pure strategies of the leader and the followers are exponentially large in a natrual representation of the problem. In zerosum games, the notion of a Stackelberg equilibrium coincides with the notion of a Nash Equilibrium <cit.>. Finding these equilibrium concepts in zerosum games can be efficiently done when the players have polynomially many pure strategies or when (in additional to some structural properties) a bestresponse oracle is available <cit.>. Despite such advancements in the case of zerosum games, little is known for generalsum games. In light of the above, we examine the computational complexity of computing a Stackelberg equilibrium in large generalsum games. We show that while there are natural large generalsum games where the Stackelberg Equilibria can be computed efficiently if the Nash equilibrium in its zerosum form could be computed efficiently, in general, structural properties that allow for efficient computation of Nash equilibrium in zerosum games are not sufficient for computing Stackelberg equilibria in generalsum games.
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