
Regular Potential Games
A fundamental problem with the Nash equilibrium concept is the existence...
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SampleEfficient Learning of Stackelberg Equilibria in GeneralSum Games
Real world applications such as economics and policy making often involv...
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A Unified View of Largescale Zerosum Equilibrium Computation
The task of computing approximate Nash equilibria in large zerosum exte...
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On the Characterization of Saddle Point Equilibrium for Security Games with Additive Utility
In this work, we investigate a security game between an attacker and a d...
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Computing Ex Ante Coordinated TeamMaxmin Equilibria in ZeroSum Multiplayer ExtensiveForm Games
Computational game theory has many applications in the modern world in b...
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Approximate Equilibria in Nonconstantsum Colonel Blotto and Lottery Blotto Games with Large Numbers of Battlefields
In the Colonel Blotto game, two players with a fixed budget simultaneous...
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Computational Complexity of Computing a QuasiProper Equilibrium
We study the computational complexity of computing or approximating a qu...
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Computing Stackelberg Equilibria of Large GeneralSum Games
We study the computational complexity of finding Stackelberg Equilibria in generalsum games, where the set of pure strategies of the leader and the followers are exponentially large in a natrual representation of the problem. In zerosum games, the notion of a Stackelberg equilibrium coincides with the notion of a Nash Equilibrium <cit.>. Finding these equilibrium concepts in zerosum games can be efficiently done when the players have polynomially many pure strategies or when (in additional to some structural properties) a bestresponse oracle is available <cit.>. Despite such advancements in the case of zerosum games, little is known for generalsum games. In light of the above, we examine the computational complexity of computing a Stackelberg equilibrium in large generalsum games. We show that while there are natural large generalsum games where the Stackelberg Equilibria can be computed efficiently if the Nash equilibrium in its zerosum form could be computed efficiently, in general, structural properties that allow for efficient computation of Nash equilibrium in zerosum games are not sufficient for computing Stackelberg equilibria in generalsum games.
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