Common knowledge equilibrium of separable securities in distributed information market

02/21/2020
by   Masahiko Ueda, et al.
0

We investigate common knowledge equilibrium of separable securities in distributed information market. We theoretically show that clearing price converges to the true value when a common prior probability distribution of information of each player is uniformly biased distribution.

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