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Collusion-proof And Sybil-proof Reward Mechanisms For Query Incentive Networks

by   Youjia Zhang, et al.
Tsinghua University

This paper explores reward mechanisms for a query incentive network in which agents seek information from social networks. In a query tree issued by the task owner, each agent is rewarded by the owner for contributing to the solution, for instance, solving the task or inviting others to solve it. The reward mechanism determines the reward for each agent and motivates all agents to propagate and report their information truthfully. In particular, the reward cannot exceed the budget set by the task owner. However, our impossibility results demonstrate that a reward mechanism cannot simultaneously achieve Sybil-proof (agents benefit from manipulating multiple fake identities), collusion-proof (multiple agents pretend as a single agent to improve the reward), and other essential properties. In order to address these issues, we propose two novel reward mechanisms. The first mechanism achieves Sybil-proof and collusion-proof, respectively; the second mechanism sacrifices Sybil-proof to achieve the approximate versions of Sybil-proof and collusion-proof. Additionally, we show experimentally that our second reward mechanism outperforms the existing ones.


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