DeepAI AI Chat
Log In Sign Up

Coalition Formation in Constant Sum Queueing Games

by   Shiksha Singhal, et al.

We analyse a coalition formation game between strategic service providers of a congestible service. The key novelty of our formulation is that it is a constant sum game, i.e., the total payoff across all service providers (or coalitions of providers) is fixed, and dictated by the total size of the market. The game thus captures the tension between resource pooling (to benefit from the resulting statistical economies of scale) and competition between coalitions over market share. In a departure from the prior literature on resource pooling for congestible services, we show that the grand coalition is in general not stable, once we allow for competition over market share. Instead, the stable configurations are duopolies, where the dominant coalition exploits its economies of scale to corner a disproportionate market share. We analyse the stable duopolies that emerge from this interaction, and also study a dynamic variant of this game.


page 1

page 2

page 3

page 4


On the ubiquity of duopolies in constant sum congestion games

We analyse a coalition formation game between strategic service provider...

Detecting service provider alliances

We present an algorithm for detecting service provider alliances. To per...

The Potential of Self-Regulation for Front-Running Prevention on DEXes

The transaction ordering dependency of the smart contracts building dece...

Network Investment Game with Wardrop Followers

We study a two-sided network investment game consisting of two sets of p...

Sharing within limits: Partial resource pooling in loss systems

Fragmentation of expensive resources, e.g., spectrum for wireless servic...

A Stackelberg viral marketing design for two competing players

A Stackelberg duopoly model in which two firms compete to maximize their...

Hosting Industry Centralization and Consolidation

There have been growing concerns about the concentration and centralizat...