Can Adversarially Robust Learning Leverage Computational Hardness?
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Making learners robust to adversarial perturbation at test time (i.e., evasion attacks) or training time (i.e., poisoning attacks) has emerged as a challenging task in machine learning. It was recently shown that for many natural settings, there exist sublinear perturbations that can drastically decrease the performance in both training and testing phase. These barriers, however, are information theoretic and only prove the existence of such successful adversarial perturbations. A natural question is whether or not we can make classifiers computationally robust to polynomial-time adversaries. In this work, we prove strong barriers against achieving such envisioned computational robustness both for evasion and poisoning attacks. In particular, we show that if the test instances come from a product distribution (e.g., uniform over {0,1}^n or [0,1]^n, or isotropic Gaussian of dimension n) and that there is an initial constant error, then there always exists a polynomial-time attack that finds adversarial examples of Hamming distance O(√(n)). For poisoning attacks, we prove that for any learning algorithm with sample complexity m, there always exist polynomial-time online poisoning attacks that tamper with O (√(m)) many examples, replace them with other correctly labeled examples, and decrease the confidence of the learner (in finding a low risk hypothesis) from ≈ 1 to ≈ 0, or alternatively increase the error for any chosen target instance x from ≈ 0 to ≈ 1. Our poisoning and evasion attacks are black-box in how they access their corresponding components of the system (i.e., the hypothesis, the concept, and the learning algorithm), and they do not make any assumptions about the classifier or the learning algorithm producing the classifier.
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