Bribery Can Get Harder in Structured Multiwinner Approval Election

09/01/2022
by   Bartosz Kusek, et al.
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We study the complexity of bribery in the context of structured multiwinner approval elections. Given such an election, we ask whether a certain candidate can join the winning committee by adding, deleting, or swapping approvals, where each such action comes at a cost and we are limited by a budget. We assume our elections to either have the candidate interval or the voter interval property, and we require the property to hold also after the bribery. While structured elections usually make manipulative attacks significantly easier, our work also shows examples of opposite behavior.

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