
Mixed Strategy Game Model Against Data Poisoning Attacks
In this paper we use game theory to model poisoning attack scenarios. We...
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Existence of an equilibrium for pure exchange economy with fuzzy preferences
This paper focuses on a new model to reach the existence of equilibrium ...
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A Gametheoretical Approach to Analyze Film Release Time
Film release dates play an important part in box office revenues because...
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Equilibrium refinements in games with many players
This paper introduces three notions of perfect equilibrium for games wit...
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On Existence of Equilibrium Under Social Coalition Structures
In a strategic form game a strategy profile is an equilibrium if no viab...
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On the Impossibility of Convergence of Mixed Strategies with No Regret Learning
We study convergence properties of the mixed strategies that result from...
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Efficient BlackBox Reductions for Separable Cost Sharing
In cost sharing games with delays, a set of agents jointly allocates a f...
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BlackBox Strategies and Equilibrium for Games with Cumulative Prospect Theoretic Players
The betweenness property of preference relations states that a probability mixture of two lotteries should lie between them in preference. It is a weakened form of the independence property and hence satisfied in expected utility theory (EUT). Experimental violations of betweenness are welldocumented and several preference theories, notably cumulative prospect theory (CPT), do not satisfy betweenness. We prove that CPT preferences satisfy betweenness if and only if they conform with EUT preferences. In game theory, lack of betweenness in the players' preference relations makes it essential to distinguish between the two interpretations of a mixed action by a player  conscious randomizations by the player and the uncertainty in the beliefs of the opponents. We elaborate on this distinction and study its implication for the definition of Nash equilibrium. This results in four different notions of equilibrium, with pure and mixed action Nash equilibrium being two of them. We dub the other two pure and mixed blackbox strategy Nash equilibrium respectively. We resolve the issue of existence of such equilibria and examine how these different notions of equilibrium compare with each other.
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