Better Approximation for Interdependent SOS Valuations

10/12/2022
by   Pinyan Lu, et al.
0

Submodular over signal (SOS) defines a family of interesting functions for which there exist truthful mechanisms with constant approximation to the social welfare for agents with interdependent valuations. The best-known truthful auction is of 4-approximation and a lower bound of 2 was proved. We propose a new and simple truthful mechanism to achieve an approximation ratio of 3.315.

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