Bayesian Conversations
share
We initiate the study of Bayesian conversations, which model interactive communication between two strategic agents without a mediator. We compare this to communication through a mediator and investigate the settings in which mediation can expand the range of implementable outcomes. In the first part of the paper, we ask whether the distributions of posterior beliefs that can be induced by a mediator protocol can also be induced by a (unmediated) Bayesian conversation. We show this is not possible – mediator protocols can “correlate” the posteriors in a way that unmediated conversations cannot. Additionally, we provide characterizations of which distributions over posteriors are achievable via mediator protocols and Bayesian conversations. In the second part of the paper, we delve deeper into the eventual outcome of two-player games after interactive communication. We focus on games where only one agent has a non-trivial action and examine the performance of communication protocols that are individually rational (IR) for both parties. We consider different levels of IR including ex-ante, interim, and ex-post; and we impose different restrictions on how Alice and Bob can deviate from the protocol: the players are committed/non-committed. Our key findings reveal that, in the cases of ex-ante and interim IR, the expected utilities achievable through a mediator are equivalent to those achievable through unmediated Bayesian conversations. However, in the models of ex-post IR and non-committed interim IR, we observe a separation in the achievable outcomes.
READ FULL TEXT
