Axiomatic characterizations of consistent approval-based committee choice rules

12/20/2021
by   Martin Lackner, et al.
0

We prove axiomatic characterizations of several important multiwinner rules within the class of approval-based committee choice rules. These are voting rules that return a set of (fixed-size) committees. In particular, we provide axiomatic characterizations of Proportional Approval Voting, the Chamberlin–Courant rule, and other Thiele methods. These rules share the important property that they satisfy an axiom called consistency, which is crucial in our characterizations.

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