Avoiding Unintended Consequences: How Incentives Aid Information Provisioning in Bayesian Congestion Games

by   Bryce L. Ferguson, et al.

When users lack specific knowledge of various system parameters, their uncertainty may lead them to make undesirable deviations in their decision making. To alleviate this, an informed system operator may elect to signal information to uninformed users with the hope of persuading them to take more preferable actions. In this work, we study public and truthful signalling mechanisms in the context of Bayesian congestion games on parallel networks. We provide bounds on the possible benefit a signalling policy can provide with and without the concurrent use of monetary incentives. We find that though revealing information can reduce system cost in some settings, it can also be detrimental and cause worse performance than not signalling at all. However, by utilizing both signalling and incentive mechanisms, the system operator can guarantee that revealing information does not worsen performance while offering similar opportunities for improvement. These findings emerge from the closed form bounds we derive on the benefit a signalling policy can provide. We provide a numerical example which illustrates the phenomenon that revealing more information can degrade performance when incentives are not used and improves performance when incentives are used.


page 1

page 2

page 3

page 4


When Congestion Games Meet Mobile Crowdsourcing: Selective Information Disclosure

In congestion games, users make myopic routing decisions to jam each oth...

Sharp Thresholds of the Information Cascade Fragility Under a Mismatched Model

We analyze a sequential decision making model in which decision makers (...

Signaling in Bayesian Network Congestion Games: the Subtle Power of Symmetry

Network congestion games are a well-understood model of multi-agent stra...

Strategically revealing capabilities in General Lotto games

Can revealing one's competitive capabilities to an opponent offer strate...

Carrots or Sticks? The Effectiveness of Subsidies and Tolls in Congestion Games

Are rewards or penalties more effective in influencing user behavior? Th...

A Unifying Approximate Potential for Weighted Congestion Games

We provide a unifying, black-box tool for establishing existence of appr...

Bayesian Persuasion for Algorithmic Recourse

When subjected to automated decision-making, decision subjects may strat...

Please sign up or login with your details

Forgot password? Click here to reset