
Asymptotically Optimal Welfare of Posted Pricing for Multiple Items with MHR Distributions
We consider the problem of posting prices for unitdemand buyers if all ...
read it

Latent Agents in Networks: Estimation and Pricing
We focus on a setting where agents in a social network consume a product...
read it

Multiattribute Auctions Based on Generalized Additive Independence
We develop multiattribute auctions that accommodate generalized additive...
read it

ParameterisedResponse ZeroIntelligence Traders
I introduce PRZI (ParameterisedResponse Zero Intelligence), a new form ...
read it

On Approximate Welfare and RevenueMaximizing Equilibria for SizeInterchangeable Bidders
In a Walrasian equilibrium (WE), all bidders are envyfree (EF), meaning...
read it

WelfarePreserving εBIC to BIC Transformation with Negligible Revenue Loss
In this paper, we investigate the problem of transforming an εBIC mecha...
read it

Efficient MultiResource, MultiUnit VCG Auction
We consider the optimization problem of a multiresource, multiunit VCG...
read it
Asymptotically Efficient MultiUnit Auctions via Posted Prices
We study the asymptotic averagecase efficiency of static and anonymous posted prices for n agents and m(n) multiple identical items with m(n)=o(n/ n). When valuations are drawn i.i.d from some fixed continuous distribution (each valuation is a vector in _+^m and independence is assumed only across agents) we show: (a) for any "upper mass" distribution there exist posted prices such that the expected revenue and welfare of the auction approaches the optimal expected welfare as n goes to infinity; specifically, the ratio between the expected revenue of our posted prices auction and the expected optimal social welfare is 1O(m(n) n/n), and (b) there do not exist posted prices that asymptotically obtain full efficiency for most of the distributions that do not satisfy the upper mass condition. When valuations are completeinformation and only the arrival order is adversarial, we provide a "tiefree" condition that is sufficient and necessary for the existence of posted prices that obtain the maximal welfare. This condition is generically satisfied, i.e., it is satisfied with probability 1 if the valuations are i.i.d. from some continuous distribution.
READ FULL TEXT
Comments
There are no comments yet.