Artificial intelligence and biological misuse: Differentiating risks of language models and biological design tools
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As advancements in artificial intelligence propel progress in the life sciences, they may also enable the weaponisation and misuse of biological agents. This article differentiates two classes of AI tools that pose such biosecurity risks: large language models (LLMs) and biological design tools (BDTs). LLMs, such as GPT-4, are already able to provide dual-use information that could have enabled historical biological weapons efforts to succeed. As LLMs are turned into lab assistants and autonomous science tools, this will further increase their ability to support research. Thus, LLMs will in particular lower barriers to biological misuse. In contrast, BDTs will expand the capabilities of sophisticated actors. Concretely, BDTs may enable the creation of pandemic pathogens substantially worse than anything seen to date and could enable forms of more predictable and targeted biological weapons. In combination, LLMs and BDTs could raise the ceiling of harm from biological agents and could make them broadly accessible. The differing risk profiles of LLMs and BDTs have important implications for risk mitigation. LLM risks require urgent action and might be effectively mitigated by controlling access to dangerous capabilities. Mandatory pre-release evaluations could be critical to ensure that developers eliminate dangerous capabilities. Science-specific AI tools demand differentiated strategies to allow access to legitimate users while preventing misuse. Meanwhile, risks from BDTs are less defined and require monitoring by developers and policymakers. Key to reducing these risks will be enhanced screening of gene synthesis, interventions to deter biological misuse by sophisticated actors, and exploration of specific controls of BDTs.
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