Approval with Runoff

03/04/2022
by   Theo Delemazure, et al.
0

We define a family of runoff rules that work as follows: voters cast approval ballots over candidates; two finalists are selected; and the winner is decided by majority. With approval-type ballots, there are various ways to select the finalists. We leverage known approval-based committee rules and study the obtained runoff rules from an axiomatic point of view. Then we analyze the outcome of these rules on single-peaked profiles, and on real data.

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