Analysis of a Traffic Remapping Attack Game in a Multi-hop Ad Hoc Network
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Multi-hop ad hoc networks are susceptible to selfish misbehavior such as traffic remapping attacks (TRAs). Selfish nodes launching such attacks acquire unduly high quality of service (QoS) by assigning higher priority to source packets and lower priority to transit packets. TRAs are easy to execute, impossible to prevent, difficult to detect, and detrimental to the QoS of non-selfish nodes. In this paper we adopt a game-theoretic approach to analyze TRAs in multi-hop ad hoc networks. We present a formal model of opportunistic plausible TRAs and the corresponding one-shot non-cooperative game. Using a heuristic rank-based payoff function, we propose a boundedly rational multistage attack strategy that both selfish and non-selfish nodes are free to use, and that allows non-selfish nodes to respond in kind to TRAs. We analyze quasi-equilibria of the arising multistage game and verify via simulation that it often coincides with a Nash equilibrium at which nodes are restrained from executing harmful TRAs, whereas harmless TRAs are permitted. Finally, we determine whether boundedly rational nodes are likely to follow alternative multistage behavior rather than the proposed multistage strategy.
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