Almost Proportional Allocations for Indivisible Chores
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In this paper, we consider how to fairly allocate m indivisible chores to a set of n (asymmetric) agents. As exact fairness cannot be guaranteed, motivated by the extensive study of EF1, EFX and PROP1 allocations, we propose and study proportionality up to any item (PROPX), and show that a PROPX allocation always exists. We argue that PROPX might be a more reliable relaxation for proportionality in practice than the commonly studied maximin share fairness (MMS) by the facts that (1) MMS allocations may not exist even with three agents, but PROPX allocations always exist even for the weighted case when agents have unequal obligation shares; (2) any PROPX allocation ensures 2-approximation for MMS, but an MMS allocation can be as bad as Θ(n)-approximation to PROPX. We propose two algorithms to compute PROPX allocations and each of them has its own merits. Our first algorithm is based on a recent refinement for the well-known procedure – envy-cycle elimination, where the returned allocation is simultaneously PROPX and 4/3-approximate MMS. A by-product result is that an exact EFX allocation for indivisible chores exists if all agents have the same ordinal preference over the chores, which might be of independent interest. The second algorithm is called bid-and-take, which applies to the weighted case. Furthermore, we study the price of fairness for (weighted) PROPX allocations, and show that the algorithm computes allocations with the optimal guarantee on the approximation ratio to the optimal social welfare without fairness constraints.
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