A Truthful Cardinal Mechanism for One-Sided Matching

03/19/2019
by   Rediet Abebe, et al.
0

We consider the design of randomized mechanisms for one-sided matching markets, where each agent is matched to one item and there are no monetary transfers. For this problem, we introduce and analyze the randomized partial improvement (RPI) mechanism. Unlike most of the mechanisms in this setting, RPI truthfully elicits cardinal (rather than just ordinal) preferences and produces a randomized matching where each agent's utility approximates the utility she would obtain in the Nash bargaining solution with a uniform random matching as the disagreement point. Intuitively, the RPI mechanism pretends that the agents are initially endowed with a uniform random assignment. Then, leveraging random sampling and invoking the partial allocation mechanism of Cole et al. (2013), RPI seeks to improve the agents' utility, while possibly, to disincentivize non-truthful reporting, leaving some of them with their initial endowment. To prove our approximation bounds, we also study the population monotonicity of the Nash bargaining solution in the context of matching markets, providing both upper and lower bounds which are of independent interest.

READ FULL TEXT

page 1

page 2

page 3

page 4

research
01/03/2023

The Price of Anarchy in One-Sided Allocation Problems with Multi-Unit Demand Agents

We study the one-sided allocation problem with multi-unit demand agents....
research
03/01/2017

Investigating the Characteristics of One-Sided Matching Mechanisms Under Various Preferences and Risk Attitudes

One-sided matching mechanisms are fundamental for assigning a set of ind...
research
09/10/2020

Tiered Random Matching Markets: Rank is Proportional to Popularity

We study the stable marriage problem in two-sided markets with randomly ...
research
11/15/2019

Graphical One-Sided Markets

We study the problem of allocating indivisible objects to a set of ratio...
research
06/03/2021

Combinatorial Algorithms for Matching Markets via Nash Bargaining: One-Sided, Two-Sided and Non-Bipartite

This paper is an attempt to deal with the recent realization (Vazirani, ...
research
09/16/2021

Incentives in Two-sided Matching Markets with Prediction-enhanced Preference-formation

Two-sided matching markets have long existed to pair agents in the absen...
research
06/08/2020

Provable Guarantees for General Two-sided Sequential Matching Markets

Two-sided markets have become increasingly more important during the las...

Please sign up or login with your details

Forgot password? Click here to reset