A Theory of Bounded Inductive Rationality
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The dominant theories of rational choice assume logical omniscience. That is, they assume that when facing a decision problem, an agent can perform all relevant computations and determine the truth value of all relevant logical/mathematical claims. This assumption is unrealistic when, for example, we offer bets on remote digits of pi or when an agent faces a computationally intractable planning problem. Furthermore, the assumption of logical omniscience creates contradictions in cases where the environment can contain descriptions of the agent itself. Importantly, strategic interactions as studied in game theory are decision problems in which a rational agent is predicted by its environment (the other players). In this paper, we develop a theory of rational decision making that does not assume logical omniscience. We consider agents who repeatedly face decision problems (including ones like betting on digits of pi or games against other agents). The main contribution of this paper is to provide a sensible theory of rationality for such agents. Roughly, we require that a boundedly rational inductive agent tests each efficiently computable hypothesis infinitely often and follows those hypotheses that keep their promises of high rewards. We then prove that agents that are rational in this sense have other desirable properties. For example, they learn to value random and pseudo-random lotteries at their expected reward. Finally, we consider strategic interactions between different agents and prove a folk theorem for what strategies bounded rational inductive agents can converge to.
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