A Short Proof of Convexity of Step-out Step-in Sequencing Games

12/19/2021
by   Coulter Beeson, et al.
0

The Step out-Step in sequencing game is a particular example of a game from the sequencing game framework of Curiel, Perderzoli, and Tijs, where coalitions of players in a queue may reorder themselves to improve the their overall cost, under some restrictions. Musegaas, Borm and Quant proved, in two papers, that a simple greedy algorithm correctly computes the valuation of a coalition, and that the game is convex. These proofs entail rather involved case analyses; in this note, we give short proofs of both results.

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