A path-based many-to-many assignment game to model Mobility-as-a-Service market networks
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As Mobility as a Service (MaaS) systems become increasingly popular, travel is changing from unimodal trips to personalized services offered by a market of mobility operators. Traditional traffic assignment models ignore the interaction of different operators. However, a key characteristic of MaaS markets is that urban trip decisions depend on both user route decisions as well as operator service and pricing decisions. We adopt a new paradigm for traffic assignment in a MaaS network of multiple operators using the concept of stable matching to allocate costs and determine prices offered by operators corresponding to user route choices and operator service choices without resorting to nonconvex bilevel programming formulations. Unlike our prior work, the proposed model allows travelers to make multimodal, multi-operator trips, resulting in stable cost allocations between competing network operators to provide MaaS for users. Algorithms are proposed to generate stability conditions for the stable outcome pricing model. Extensive computational experiments demonstrate the use of the model, and effectiveness of the proposed algorithm, to handling pricing responses of MaaS operators in technological and capacity changes, government acquisition, consolidation, and firm entry, using the classic Sioux Falls network.
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