A Note on the Complexity of Manipulating Weighted Schulze Voting

08/28/2018
by   Julian Müller, et al.
0

We prove that the constructive weighted coalitional manipulation problem for the Schulze voting rule can be solved in polynomial time for an unbounded number of candidates and an unbounded number of manipulators.

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