A Markov Game of Age of Information From Strategic Sources With Full Online Information
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We investigate the performance of concurrent remote sensing from independent strategic sources, whose goal is to minimize a linear combination of the freshness of information and the updating cost. In the literature, this is often investigated from a static perspective of setting the update rate of the sources a priori, either in a centralized optimal way or with a distributed game-theoretic approach. However, we argue that truly rational sources would better make such a decision with full awareness of the current age of information, resulting in a more efficient implementation of the updating policies. To this end, we investigate the scenario where sources independently perform a stateful optimization of their objective. Their strategic character leads to the formalization of this problem as a Markov game, for which we find the resulting Nash equilibrium. This can be translated into practical smooth threshold policies for their update. The results are eventually tested in a sample scenario, comparing a centralized optimal approach with two distributed approaches with different objectives for the players.
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