A Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Social Impact of Connected and Automated Vehicles
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In this paper, we address the much-anticipated deployment of connected and automated vehicles (CAVs) in society by modeling and analyzing the social-mobility dilemma in a game-theoretic approach. We formulate this dilemma as a normal-form game by constructing an intuitive payoff function inspired by the socially beneficial outcomes of a mobility system consisting of CAVs. We show that the game is equivalent to the Prisoner's dilemma which implies that the rational collective decision is the opposite of the socially optimum (e.g., Tragedy of the Commons). To tackle this phenomenon, we present two different approaches, i.e., one with a preference structure and the other with institutional arrangements. In the first approach, we implement a social mechanism that enforces players to non-CAV travel and derive a lower bound of players that leads to an equilibrium of non-CAV traveling. In the second approach, we investigate the possibility of players bargaining to create an institution that enforces non-CAV travel. We show that as the number of players increases, the incentive ratio of non-CAV travel over CAV-travel tends to zero. We also performed a numerical study for the latter approach demonstrating the effectiveness of our results.
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