A Douglas-Rachford splitting for semi-decentralized generalized Nash equilibrium seeking in Monotone Aggregative Games

03/28/2018
by   Giuseppe Belgioioso, et al.
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We address the generalized Nash equilibrium seeking problem for noncooperative agents playing non-strictly monotone aggregative games with affine coupling constraints. First, we use operator theory to characterize the generalized Nash equilibria of the game as the zeros of a monotone setvalued operator. Then, we massage the Douglas-Rachford splitting to solve the monotone inclusion problem and derive a single layer, semi-decentralized algorithm whose global convergence is guaranteed under mild assumptions. The potential of the proposed Douglas-Rachford algorithm is shown on a simplified resource allocation game, where we observe faster convergence with respect to forward-backward algorithms.

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