A Differentially Private Incentive Design for Traffic Offload to Public Transportation
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Increasingly large trip demands have strained urban transportation capacity, which consequently leads to traffic congestion. In this work, we focus on mitigating traffic congestion by incentivizing passengers to switch from private to public transit services. We address the following challenges. First, the passengers incur inconvenience costs when participating in traffic offload due to delay and discomfort, and thus need to be reimbursed. The inconvenience cost, however, is unknown to the government when choosing the incentives. Furthermore, participating in traffic offload raises privacy concerns from passengers. An adversary could infer personal information, (e.g., daily routine, region of interest, and wealth), by observing the decisions made by the government, which are known to the public. We adopt the concept of differential privacy and propose privacy-preserving incentive designs under two settings, denoted as two-way communication and one-way communication. Under two-way communication, we focus on how the government should reveal passengers' inconvenience costs to properly incentivize them while preserving differential privacy. We formulate the problem as a mixed integer linear program, and propose a polynomial-time approximation algorithm. We show the proposed approach achieves truthfulness, individual rationality, social optimality, and differential privacy. Under one-way communication, we focus on how the government should design the incentives without revealing passengers' inconvenience costs while still preserving differential privacy. We formulate the problem as a convex program, and propose a differentially private and near-optimal solution algorithm. A numerical case study using Caltrans Performance Measurement System (PeMS) data source is presented as evaluation.
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