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A Cut-And-Choose Mechanism to Prevent Gerrymandering

by   Jamie Tucker-Foltz, et al.

We present a novel mechanism to endogenously choose a fair division of a state into electoral districts in a two-party setting. We do not rely on any spatial or geometric properties of the distribution of voters, but instead assume that any possible partition of the population is feasible. One party divides the map, then the other party observes the division and chooses the value for a parameter that determines the exact mechanics of the election. Despite the inherent asymmetry, we prove that the mechanism always yields a completely fair outcome, up to a small rounding factor. We also develop a graphical representation of the game to motivate its analysis.


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