A 3/2-approximation algorithm for the Student-Project Allocation problem

04/08/2018
by   Frances Cooper, et al.
0

The Student-Project Allocation problem with lecturer preferences over Students (SPA-S) comprises three sets of agents, namely students, projects and lecturers, where students have preferences over projects and lecturers have preferences over students. In this scenario we seek a stable matching, that is, an assignment of students to projects such that there is no student and lecturer who have an incentive to deviate from their assignee/s. We study SPA-ST, the extension of SPA-S in which the preference lists of students and lecturers need not be strictly ordered, and may contain ties. In this scenario, stable matchings may be of different sizes, and it is known that MAX SPA-ST, the problem of finding a maximum stable matching in SPA-ST, is NP-hard. We present a linear-time 3/2-approximation algorithm for MAX SPA-ST and an Integer Programming (IP) model to solve MAX SPA-ST optimally. We compare the approximation algorithm with the IP model experimentally using randomly-generated data. We find that the performance of the approximation algorithm easily surpassed the 3/2 bound, constructing a stable matching within 92 instances.

READ FULL TEXT

page 1

page 2

page 3

page 4

research
04/26/2018

An Integer Programming Approach to the Student-Project Allocation Problem with Preferences over Projects

The Student-Project Allocation problem with preferences over Projects (S...
research
02/12/2021

Online voluntary mentoring: Optimising the assignment of students and mentors

After the closure of the schools in Hungary from March 2020 due to the p...
research
11/21/2019

An Algorithm for Strong Stability in the Student-Project Allocation Problem with Ties

We study a variant of the Student-Project Allocation problem with lectur...
research
01/27/2020

Stable Matchings with Diversity Constraints: Affirmative Action is beyond NP

We investigate the following many-to-one stable matching problem with di...
research
10/02/2021

Capacity Expansion in the College Admission Problem

The college admission problem plays a fundamental role in several real-w...
research
08/12/2021

Sophisticated Students in Boston Mechanism and Gale-Shapley Algorithm for School Choice Problem

We present our experimental results of simulating the school choice prob...
research
07/26/2023

Causal Effects in Matching Mechanisms with Strategically Reported Preferences

A growing number of central authorities use assignment mechanisms to all...

Please sign up or login with your details

Forgot password? Click here to reset