Objective Probability

03/27/2013
by   Henry E. Kyburg Jr, et al.
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A distinction is sometimes made between "statistical" and "subjective" probabilities. This is based on a distinction between "unique" events and "repeatable" events. We argue that this distinction is untenable, since all events are "unique" and all events belong to "kinds", and offer a conception of probability for A1 in which (1) all probabilities are based on -- possibly vague -- statistical knowledge, and (2) every statement in the language has a probability. This conception of probability can be applied to very rich languages.

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